This volume gives an overview of the subject of mathematical logic, placing primary emphasis on theory instead of the development of skills. It contains chapters on the history of logic, first and second order quantification theory, metatheory, and some of the philosophical implications of recent work in the field. Needless to say, none of these topics is treated in any great detail owing to the space limitations. Care has been taken by the author, however, to insure that his discussions do (...) not trade mistakes and clarity for brevity. Each section provides the reader with a grasp of the central issues and adequate information to approach more advanced literature with some confidence. The treatment of topics such as recursive functions, Skolem's paradox for set theory, and the place of mathematical logic in the study of philosophy is rarely found in introductory treatments. No special training in either mathematics or Logic is presupposed by any of the sections. Ample exercises are included which are, in some cases, quite challenging. Answers to many of these are provided. In addition, there is also a useful annotated bibliography.--R. P. M. (shrink)

Perhaps no work since John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has attracted as much recent attention as Robert Nozick’s case for a minimal state—an ingeniously argued critique, not only of antinomian individualism, but also of liberal and socialist contractualism. It might be added that the book is no solace either to more conservative political theorists, who lament state incursion into private life, but whose political structures exhibit either actual or potential constriction of human life. Nozick’s book is both a searching (...) examination of the limitations of utilitarian consequentialism and the redistributivism of Rawls. His essential theme is that "a minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts etc., is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right." It is also Nozick’s contention that the coercive power of the state should not be used paternalistically to prohibit activities to people for their own protection, or to force some citizens to aid others. The last part of the book is a framework for Nozick’s utopia, and it is in this section that an essentially theoretical approach, amplified by little political or sociological data, exhibits its defects. One suspects that almost all states started with simplistic hopes for minimal coercive activity, and succumbed almost inevitably to the metastasis of function as socio-political life grew in size and complexity. Night watchmen become more than night watchmen when more than watching is needed. Moreover, Nozick’s utopia would seem to necessitate, at least by implication, coercive redistributivism and some kind of compensatory or levelling taxation process. This reviewer is not sure that he understands precisely what Nozick considers correct property theory in a state of nature. The author modestly asserts the tentative, incomplete, and conjectural nature of his work. But the taxed and manipulated citizen who grows in sympathy for the sentiments of Proudhon’s famous litany should welcome this highly literate and well argued case.—R.P.M. (shrink)

Although Toffler has not written an in-depth philosophical analysis of social problems, he certainly has written a highly readable popular diagnosis of the phenomenon of cultural change which social philosophers should be considering, and has given a synoptic view of contemporary culture similar to Pitirim Sorokin's popular Crisis of Our Age in the forties. Toffler's thesis is "that there are discoverable limits to the amount of change that the human organism can absorb, and that by endlessly accelerating change without first (...) determining these limits, we may submit masses of men to demands they simply cannot tolerate." Future shock is, therefore, both the physical and psychological impairment caused by reluctance and inability to absorb the rapid changes that an age of discontinuity produces. Psychic distress is identified in Leon Festinger's arresting phrase, "cognitive dissonance," the rejection or denial of information that challenges preconceptions. Physical distress is analyzed by such interesting research tools as the Rahe Life-Change Units Scale which attempts to correlate change factors with physical health. The philosophic base of modern life is seen in a Heraclitean or Bergsonian flux which ontologizes change itself and sees social and political conflict inevitably provoked by rapid change confronting an older society whose substantialist structures reflect more the stable and enduring values of an older culture. It is from the vantage point of change theory that Toffler explains the contemporary turmoil in domestic, social, political, and religious realms; and although he does not employ the more formal idiom of a Vico or Spengler in the discussion of Zeitgeist, he recognizes thought and life style as even more significant than ever in a culture in which communication is so widespread and immediate. He uses the imagery of eight hundred 62-year lifetimes to illustrate man's history of the last 50,000 years, noting the comparative stability of the previous segments and the bewildering rapidity of change cycle of idea, application, and diffusion in the last sixty-year period. He analyzes progressively the accelerative thrust that creates conflict between cultures and generations; describes the typical attitudes of citizens in an Age of Transience towards time, things, places, people, organization, and ideas; and sees "modular" man as a being for whom permanence of marriage, career, educational values, and convictions yields to "temporariness." Organizations in such a climate are characterized by lateral rather than hierarchical power relationships in which "super-industrial man," committed more to his craft than to his company, assumes more decision-making responsibility in an "adhocracy" of transient values and relationships. Toffler interestingly sees bureaucracy on the decline, technology as contributing to plurality of choice rather than to standardization, and to a kinetic imagery of impermanence in aesthetics. For the most part, Toffler, the diagnostician, resists the temptation to be the pleader. His happily infrequent divagations produce less than satisfactory critiques of family life, education, and genetic engineering. It is inevitable that this book will be criticized by specialists as bewilderingly diffuse, and verging at times on science fiction; it is possible too that the strategy of "social futurism" suggested by the author will elicit less than undiluted enthusiasm, and that inexact references to Toynbee and Maritain may be questioned. But the essential purpose of this volume to give a unified vision of contemporary culture in terms of the adaptive reaction to change--all this has been admirably realized. And one feels that the author indeed possesses the vision and research tools for particularized study in the areas treated here quite generally.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This handsome volume is an outgrowth of Giambattista Vico, An International Symposium, edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden White and published in 1969, in which Vichian influences were explored by distinguished scholars in diverse fields. The original volume was meant to be exploratory in nature, analyzing Vico’s sometimes obscure thought in terms of historical theory and contemporary humanistic relevance.

This introduction to formal logic is one of the few paperbacks available that provides a broad survey of the field. In addition to a clear presentation of sentential and first order quantificational logic, there is a discussion of the philosophical significance of recent work by Church, Gödel, and Tarski. The proof technique employed throughout is the indirect argument. Since proofs of this sort can be converted into mechanical tests of validity, it is easier than most for a beginning student to (...) grasp. Furthermore, this style of argument has long been recognized as the most obvious method of showing arguments in ordinary language to be invalid. Interesting treatments of the construction of decision machines, the nature of formal systems, and the application of logic to mathematics are included in the last section. Numerous exercises are included for which some answers are provided.--R. P. M. (shrink)

The essays in this volume are based on addresses given during a colloquium on free logic, modal logic, and related areas held at the University of California in 1968. The majority of the contributors are well known for their writings in these fields and their papers are as illuminating as they are technical. In the first paper, Lambert and Bas C. Van Fraassen apply free logic to several controversies in quantified modal logic. One of these is Putman's argument that 'Nothing (...) is both red and green all over' can be had as a theorem of modal logic. Lambert and Van Fraassen provide a counter example to this claim and then show that the argument only holds in systems allowing possible individuals. Jaako Hintikka's essay also deals with 'free' modal logics in much the same way as Hintikka's other papers and discusses some of the criticisms of Quine of the entire enterprise of quantified modal logic. In another paper, H. Leblanc and R. K. Meyer provide truth-value semantics for the theory of types and hence an alternative semantic structure for functional calculi of any order. In addition to these essays, there are papers by R. Thomason and Dana Scott on modal logic, J. Vickers on probability logic, and Peter Woodruff on truth value gaps. To anyone interested in these various areas this collection is sure to be welcome.--R. P. M. (shrink)

Vander Veer's aim is to show that ordinary-language analysis is a failure. To show that something is a failure of course requires a discussion of what counts as success. Here the yardstick is the defeat of skepticism; and the book is a long argument that ordinary-language methods do not send the skeptic packing. Two questions naturally arise concerning this enterprise: First, is there really some common set of doctrines, procedures, problems, attitudes, or styles of argument which can be taken as (...) characterizing ordinary-language philosophy? Second, is defeat of skepticism a clearly defined goal and is it a fair test of ordinary-language philosophy? (shrink)

This one-volume text in Christian ethics is an attempt by L. Harold DeWolf, Professor of Systematic Theology at Wesley Theological Seminary at a comprehensive treatment of contemporary ethical theory and practice. The author defines his subject within a specifically Christian context; traces the relativistic revolt against moral norms; gives a brief resume of Hebrew and Christian ethics; presents a rather rigorous interpretation of natural law theory; formulates a series of ethical guidelines based essentially on rational responsibility, consistency, ideal values, social (...) concern, and ultimate reality. He then indicates how through ecclesia and community these principles might be applied to such diverse problems as marriage and the family, environment, cultural depersonalization, civil disobedience and war. To those who feel that ethics should be a reasoned science free of theological commitment this work will seem too ambitious; to those who feel that existential ethical judgments should proceed from the total intellectual and religious resources of the individual, it will stand as an updated if necessarily diffuse outline of contemporary Christian ethical theory, formulated with insight and sensitivity.—R. P. M. (shrink)

A detailed analysis of Leopold Ranke’s blending of universal values with factual data in the writing of scientific history, especially helpful in explaining Ranke’s intellectual development, and showing that Ranke’s famous claim to portray what actually happened was much more than an unqualified commitment to factual history. The author suggests that, despite the formidable reputation of Ranke in giving to his discipline a new direction and a new role for history in culture, his was not any startling discovery of the (...) new, as much as an unprecedented way of combining notions and contexts. Ranke is seen as a complex character, committed to factuality, objectivity, the uniqueness of historical forms, the analysis of states as "ideas of God" representing collective destinies, but even more concerned with the connectedness of history in its universality and individuality. Ranke, though involved in epistemological questions, was wary of philosophy. He saw in the term "philosophy of history" a devious invention of philosophers for the enslavement of history. He was certainly wrong in his early appraisal of philosophy as "always negating." Yet for the general, abstract, and universal, Ranke developed a progressive sympathy in the important process of historical understanding, and in his later years he saw philosophy as more than the Fichtean romanticism which seemed so far removed from objectivity. He sided with his friends Schelling and Schleiermacher against Hegel at the University of Berlin. (shrink)

This is a large-scale work by an outstanding Czechoslovakian scientist and philosopher on the problem of explanation in science and related issues. The approach is that of classical twentieth century philosophy of science combined with an information theoretical model. Briefly put, the communication model has three major components: the source of information, the observer, and the statements which communicate the results of cognitive activity in science. These are pictured as three blocks connected by arrows running both ways, and are called (...) A, B, and C, respectively. Hence the objects which science depicts are found in Block A, the statements made in "scientific language" about these are in Block C, and the conceptual apparatus, scientific theories and procedures are on Block B. The point of the double arrows is to emphasize the interactions between all three components of the model. (shrink)

In 1938 Maurice Mandelbaum published his well-known work, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, an insightful study of relativism, judgments of fact and value, causation, and the philosophy of history. Consequent to the publication of this work, the author noted increased interest in these problems, beginning with Carl Hempel’s "The Function of General Laws in History," and R. Collingwood’s posthumous work, The Idea of History, muted interest in the "fact" and "value" problems of the 30s in favor of the kinds of (...) explanation that can be sought or found in history. (shrink)

Although it now seems clear that no verificationalist [[sic]] account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaningful discourse is adequate, many philosophers still hope that some general criterion will be formulated. This book is an attempt to supply such a theory. It opens with a discussion of the various views of meaninglessness that have been proposed during this century. Taking operationalism, verificationalism, [[sic]] and the category mistake theory in turn, Erwin provides an analysis of their shortcomings. In addition to (...) the now stock criticisms of the verification theory, an argument is set out to the effect that no workable verificationalist [[sic]] position can theoretically be developed. Erwin also casts doubt on the view of meaninglessness as the lack of a truth value, and attacks Strawson's famous theory of reference failure and truth value gaps. The author's position emerges as equating meaninglessness with "a priori falseness." This would, of course, make all self contradictions meaningless, and the denial of any meaningless statement true. Both of these consequences, as well as the criterion from which they spring, are bound to be controversial. Perhaps the chief virtue of this book is that it succinctly presents all the opposing positions on the subject and gives a detailed analysis of each. Hence, even if Erwin's thesis is incorrect, his book is still worthwhile.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This useful anthology contains selections from classical as well as contemporary authors on the subject of meaning. Although these are not arranged chronologically, the reader is made aware of the difference of purpose and approach between those philosophers trying to bolster and empiricism by a theory of meaning and those philosophers and linguists who find an intrinsic interest in the subject. Of particular interest is the juxtaposition of an essay by William Alston in which the shortcomings of the referential, ideational (...) and behavioral meaning theories are discussed with selections from representative philosophers of each view. Two papers from proponents of the speech-act model of language give a clear introduction to the basics of what is considered by many to be a major breakthrough in the philosophy of language. The last two entries constitute a dialogue of the utility of the analysis of semantic components. Essays on the relation of meaning to philosophy and linguistics by the editors are also included.--R. P. M. (shrink)

This is a study in what Naess calls the "new historiography of science," i.e., the view that science is and has been discontinuous, non-accumulative, and somewhat arbitrary. Readers familiar with the controversy between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper will undoubtedly note that Naess attempts to achieve a synthesis of their opposed positions. Against Popper, Naess argues there is no standard of rejection and refutation for theories in science that will bear the weight of both the history and present practice of (...) the various disciplines. Instead there are many such standards and herein lies the "pluralistic aspect" of the scientific enterprise. But contrary to Kuhn, irrationalism is not found to be the alternative to a Popperian framework. What is required according to Naess is a broader conception of rationality and decision making than classical philosophers and historians of science were willing to embrace. The outline of such a conception is presented here. Naess also favors encouragement of a methodological pluralistic approach since he finds that the possibilities are almost endless. Nor is the history of science exempt from this invitation. In a final chapter Naess turns his thesis to historiography itself and explores the consequences of pluralism and possibilism in this field.—R.P.M. (shrink)

Despite the title, this book is really an introduction to the study of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the significance of his way of philosophizing for problems in social and political thought. As the author points out, Wittgenstein was not a political theorist; he "did not write about society or history or revolution or alienation". The author, obviously conversant with the work and methodology of Wittgenstein, has written a work ad mentem magistri, not attempting to isolate specific doctrine (...) but to indicate how a philosopher, convinced of the centrality of language in human life, would reflect on the problems of associative life. Language is seen, not as a system of labels, but as the carrier of human culture that both asserts the individuality and communality of men, and illuminates "the nature of innovation and continuity in human affairs." The author sees the later Wittgenstein as rejecting his earlier satisfaction with the Tractatus, being careful to point out that Wittgenstein did not question ethical aesthetic and religious values, as much as to claim that they could not be talked about in a philosophically meaningful way. Roughly, the second half of the book concerns itself with social and political implications, the quarrel between Socrates and Thrasymachus on the nature of justice being seen as paradigmatic of contemporary concerns about the objectivity of social values. The book is significant not because it develops a political philosophy, for it quite obviously does not; but because it suggests possibilities and indicates a developing respect in Wittgenstein for metaphysics and objectivity, and a desire to know and understand that objectivity by means of language analysis.—R.P.M. (shrink)